Engaging, flying through, letting go
Engagement has its own courtesy. The synchronisation function matches the autopilot's commands to the aircraft's current attitude at the moment of engagement, so the controls do not snatch toward some stale target. And the autopilot should be engaged when the aircraft is in trim: engage it out of trim and it inherits a standing control force it must hold from the first second, working against the very servos that should be making fine corrections.
Engaged autopilots also differ in what they do with the flight-deck controls, and the syllabus names two configurations:
the flight-deck controls move with the control surfaces — while the autopilot is engaged, the column and wheel are back-driven, so the pilot can see and feel what the autopilot is commanding, a continuous cue to its activity, though anything resting against the controls then resists the autopilot itself.
the flight-deck controls remain static — while the autopilot is engaged, the surfaces move, the controls do not, and the flight deck is quieter for it, but the pilot gets no control-movement cue at all; awareness of what the automatics are doing must come entirely from the instruments and the FMA.
Comparing the two, the moving configuration gives visibility with bustle, the static one a calm that demands vigilance.
Control wheel steering (CWS) is manual manoeuvring of the aircraft through the autopilot computer and the autopilot servos, using the control column or wheel. It is an autopilot mode: the pilot's force on the column becomes an input the computer translates into servo commands. The pilot, not the autopilot, is controlling the flight path; there are flight phases where CWS cannot be used (the take-off and the landing among them); the flight path and performance protections of the full modes may not be available; and the feel and response can differ noticeably from ordinary manual flight, because every input is passing through the computer's interpretation.
Touch control steering (TCS) reaches the same goal down a different path, and the differences are the point: with TCS the autopilot remains engaged but its servos are disconnected from the control surfaces while the TCS button is held, the pilot flying the aircraft directly, conventionally, for exactly as long as the button is depressed. On release the servos reconnect and the autopilot returns to its previously engaged modes. CWS flies the pilot's wishes through the computer; TCS takes the servos out of the circuit and hands them back afterwards.
One rule governs how many autopilots work at once: only one autopilot may be engaged at any time, except when APP is armed, where additional autopilots join to facilitate a fail-operational autoland, the redundant automatic landing the autoland lesson covers in full. Until then, one computer flies; the rest wait.
Failures, disengagement and trim
The autopilot lives on other systems' data, and that dependence cuts both ways. Failure of other systems may take the autopilot away (lose the attitude source and the inner loop has nothing to fly), and, more insidiously, incorrect data from other systems may lead the autopilot into an undesirable aircraft state, potentially without any failure indication at all: a subtly wrong airspeed or attitude feed gives the loop wrong truths to correct toward, and every annunciation may stay green while it does. The defence is the one the syllabus states: prompt and appropriate pilot intervention, noticing that the aircraft's behaviour and the expected behaviour have parted company, and taking over early, exactly as the previous lesson taught for the oscillating loop.
Letting go is designed as carefully as engaging. The proper procedure is to disengage with the design method, typically a disconnect button on the control wheel or sidestick, with a hand on the controls to catch whatever forces the autopilot was holding. Both aural and visual warnings announce any disengagement, and their duration carries meaning:
temporary warning — for an intended disengagement made by the design method.
continuous warning — for an unintended disengagement, or one made any other way, because a disconnect nobody asked for is exactly the event no crew should be able to miss.
On aircraft with manual trim the trim wheel and the autopilot must respect each other: the autopilot may not engage unless the controls are in trim; flown properly, the aircraft will normally be in trim when the autopilot is disconnected, because the autopilot has been trimming as it flew; and using the manual trim while the autopilot is engaged will normally disconnect it, with a risk of an out-of-trim situation handed to a pilot who was not expecting the aircraft at all.
That is the machine itself. What the crew watches while it flies, the flight director's bars and the FMA's annunciations, is the next lesson.